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Does Reducing Spatial Differentiation Increase Product Differentiation?
Effects of Zoning on Retail Entry and Format Variety
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of spatial zoning restrictions on retail market outcomes. We
estimate a structural model of entry, location and format choice across a large number of
markets in the presence of zoning restrictions. The paper contributes to the literature in three
ways: First, the paper demonstrates that the omission of zoning restrictions in the extant
literature on entry and location choice leads to biased estimates of the factors affecting market
potential and competitive intensity. Second, the cross‐market variations in zoning regulations
helps us test and provide evidence for the theory that constraints on spatial differentiation will
lead to greater product differentiation. Finally, we provide qualitative insight on how zoning
impacts retail entry and format variety; in particular we evaluate the impact of prototypical
zoning arrangements such as “centralized,” “neighborhood,” and “outskirt” zoning on entry
and format variety.
Keywords: Product Variety, Zoning, Entry, Location Choice, Retail Competition, Discrete
Games, Multiple Equilibria, Structural Modeling

“With a city entirely zoned they [realtors] could assure purchasers of residential property that their
neighborhoods would never be encroached upon by business, while on the other hand, zoning would
give business property a touch of monopoly value. Accordingly, the signs went up on vacant lots: “Zoned
for business,” or “Zoned for apartments” with the definite implication that such action on the part of the
public authorities had resulted in giving the property a higher and more assured value than it would
otherwise have.” Munro (1931, p. 203)

1. Introduction
Zoning is a device for land use planning used by local governments, and refers to the
practice of designating permitted uses of land based on mapped zones within their jurisdictions
which separate one set of land uses from another. Broadly, land is zoned for residential,
industrial, commercial, agricultural, forests, open spaces and recreational purposes among
others. Typically there are also finer regulations on the types of residences, industries and
commercial ventures that are allowed on particular parcels of land. The practice of zoning in
modern days began in the 1860’s in Germany (Ladd 1990), and was widely embraced in the
United States during the 1920’s, with New York City passing its first zoning ordinance in 1916
(Fischel 2004). While there has been much research, discussions and debate in the urban
planning literature about the motivations and effects of residential zoning (see Chung (1994)
and Pogodzinski (1991) for reviews), there has been limited research on how zoning impacts
market outcomes. For example, how do changes in zoning impact retailer entry and choice of
formats due to their impact on retail competition and profits in equilibrium?
The paper estimates a static, structural simultaneous move game of endogenous entry,
location and format choice across a large number of markets within the United States, taking
into account the various local zoning restrictions on commercial entry. We use our analysis to
help answer substantive, econometric and theoretical questions of interest related to spatial
zoning. First, the paper introduces the zoning dimension to the by‐now extensive literature on
entry (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991; Mazzeo, 2002; Vitorino, 2010; Zhu, Singh and Manuszak,
2009; Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009), and location choice (e.g., Seim, 2006; Orhun, 2012; Watson,
2009; Zhu and Singh, 2009). Having access to zoning data helps us answer an econometric
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question with important substantive implications. Specifically, does the omission of zoning
restrictions in the extant literature on entry and location choice bias estimates of factors
affecting market potential and competitive intensity and if so, by how much? Zoning is a
constraint with a negative impact on that location to generate profits. When zoning is omitted,
this negative unobservable is absorbed in the error term. 1 To the extent that zoning is correlated
with market characteristics such as population and income that impact retailer profits, this
omission will lead to biases in the estimated coefficients for these variables. For example, if
locations with higher incomes systematically have tougher zoning restrictions that restrict
entry, incomes and the unobservables will be negatively correlated, and the income coefficient
will be biased towards zero (i.e., the effect of income on profits will be underestimated, because
profitable high income locations will appear unprofitable due to lack of entry due to zoning
restrictions in those locations). The direction of the bias for competition effects is harder to
predict ex ante because the effect of zoning on competitor entry depends on the correlation
between zoning restrictions and market characteristics like income and population.2 The bias in
estimates is not merely an econometric issue; given the difficulties associated with assembling
zoning data, understanding the magnitude of the bias due to the omission of zoning restrictions
can be valuable in guiding whether policy makers, firms and researchers need to invest in
collecting zoning data in making decisions or recommendations.
Second, the paper contributes to the theoretical literature on the link between spatial and
product differentiation. Theory predicts that constraints on spatial differentiation will lead to
greater product differentiation; for example, in the context of the Internet, Kuksov (2004)
conjectured that firms will respond to the inability to spatially differentiate on the Internet with
greater product differentiation. Bar‐Isaac et al., (2009) elaborate on this argument of endogenous
differentiation to explain the long‐tail effect of greater product variety in Internet retail
environments. However the theory has not faced empirical scrutiny. As zoning restrictions

For example, Orhun (2012) considers the importance of allowing for location specific unobservables to potentially
control for omitted location characteristics such as zoning, public transportation and major road intersections.
1
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See Section 4.1 for a more elaborate discussion of bias in competition effects.
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affect the ability of retailers to spatially differentiate, we exploit cross‐market variations in
spatial zoning restrictions for retailers to empirically test the validity of the theoretical
prediction. Specifically, we test whether tighter zoning restrictions lead to greater format
variety. In the context of retailing, if zoning prevents spatial differentiation, retailers will
differentiate more on retail formats. For example, in food retailing, retailers can offer many
formats: supermarkets, supercenters, convenience stores, mass‐merchandising etc. Hence, if
theory were true, tighter zoning will increase format variety without necessarily reducing the
number of stores.
Finally, it provides substantive insight for citizens and local regulators who decide on
zoning regulations, and firms who have to assess the equilibrium impact of zoning regulations.
We use the estimates of the structural model to perform counterfactual simulations on how
zoning regulations impacts entry, location and format choice. Specifically, we assess how
certain “prototype” zoning approaches such as “centralized,” “neighborhood” or “outskirt”
zoning affect retail entry and retail format mix.
The paper leverages on a method introduced in Datta and Sudhir (2012) to obtain zoning
data from a publicly available digital dataset called National Land Cover Dataset (NLCD). In
spite of the importance of zoning in retail entry and location decisions, extant research has
ignored the issue primarily because of the lack of easily available zoning data across a large
number of markets. We use NLCD in conjunction with Geographic Information System tools
such as ArcGIS and Google Earth to recover zoning data in any number of markets across the
entire U.S.
We use maximum likelihood estimation for estimation of the static discrete game.3 Some
well‐known methodological challenges in estimating discrete games include the possibility of
multiple equilibria in the model, multiple equilibria in the data, and slow convergence or
potential non‐convergence of the MLE estimation algorithm. We use recent innovations in the
3

Alternatives to likelihood based approaches include method of moments (Thomadsen 2005; Draganska et al., 2009),
minimum distance or asymptotic least square estimators (Pakes et al., 2007; Bajari et al., 2007; Pesendorfer and
Schmidt‐Dengler 2008) and maximum score estimators (Fox and Bajari 2010; Fox 2007; Ellickson et al., 2010).
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literature to address these issues. We use the nested pseudo likelihood (NPL) approach to
address the equilibrium selection challenge in the face of multiple equilibria in the model by
selecting the equilibrium most consistent with the conditional choice probabilities (CCP) in the
data. To address the challenge of equilibrium selection in the presence of multiple equilibria in
the data, we combine a “parallel NPL” procedure, which intuitively involves starting from
different starting values of CCP with a genetic algorithm approach which ensures we search
over a large space of equilibria as suggested by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2005). Finally, to
speed convergence, we use a transformed contraction mapping suggested by Kasahara and
Shimotsu (2008).
Besides the literature on entry and location games, there is a nascent and
contemporaneous empirical literature that has begun to explore the relationships between
market structure and zoning or land use regulations. Suzuki (2010) and Nishida (2010) study
the endogenous market entry decisions of firms, controlling for market level land use
regulations that involve additional investment or time on behalf of a firm in order to obtain the
permission to enter a market.4 Not surprisingly, they find that such land use regulations can be
anti‐competitive by acting as a barrier for entry through higher entry costs. Ridley et al., (2010)
use zoning data for 15 municipalities in the Minneapolis‐St. Paul area to study how zoning
impacts the number of rivals, prices of the central retailer and the average distance from rivals.
Through reduced form regressions, they show that in the geographical area around a central
retailer, the fraction of area that is zoned for commercial use has a positive correlation with the
number of rivals, the prices of the central retailer, and its average distance from rivals. In sum
their results support the hypothesis that tighter commercial zoning leads to fewer rivals, but
still overall a firm faces more price competition because of zoning‐forced spatial proximity.
None of these papers tackle the issue of format variety, which can moderate the effects on entry
and competition.

Suzuki (2010) uses seven indices to measure the stringency of land use (zoning) regulations in 60 Texas counties to
study the entry decisions of mid‐scale chain hotels in those counties. Nishida (2010) studies the entry decisions of
convenience store chains in Okinawa, Japan. In his application, an entire market is counted as a zoned market if
retailers are required to obtain development permission from the government in order to enter the market.
4
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Our key findings are as follows: First, we find significant biases in the estimates for
factors affecting market potential and competitive intensity when zoning is not accounted for.
Therefore future empirical work on entry and location choice needs to incorporate zoning
restrictions in their analysis. Second, zoning restrictions do reduce entry, but over small ranges
of restrictions, firms respond by increasing format variety without reducing entry.

This

suggests that if one does not take into account format responses, one might see weak linkages
between zoning restrictions and entry and potentially conclude that zoning has limited impact
on retail entry decisions. Substantively, we find that different prototypical arrangements like
centralized, neighborhood and outskirt zoning can lead to different retail structures in terms of
both the number and type of stores in a market. Outskirt zoning leads to more homogeneous
formats, while centralized zoning leads to more format variety. Finally, we demonstrate
empirical evidence to the theoretical conjectures that firms indeed respond to tightened spatial
differentiation (or inability to spatially differentiate) through greater product (in our case
format) differentiation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model and
estimation strategy. Section 3 describes the entry and location choice data and our approach to
obtaining spatial zoning data. Section 4 discusses the potential sources of estimation bias
followed by a discussion of the estimates of the model and Section 5 presents the results of
counterfactual simulations. Section 6 concludes with a brief summary of the findings and the
limitations of this research.
2. Model and Estimation Strategy
2.1. Model of Strategic Entry, Location and Store Format Choice
We model the entry, location and store format choice as a two‐stage game in which the
firms first make entry decisions and then the location and format choices. More precisely, in the
first stage, each firm, i decides whether or not to enter a market m (m = 1, 2,…, M); subsequently,
in the second stage the entering firms simultaneously choose their respective store type or
format, f (f = 1,2,…, F), and store location within the market.

5

For the purposes of illustration, imagine a square city with a grid of Lm discrete blocks or
‘locations’ (Figure 1(a)). Firm iʹs payoff at each location, l (l = 1, 2,…, Lm), is modeled as a
function of the endogenous choice of format type, f, the market characteristics at the location, xl,
the actions (entry, location and format choices) of all firms, a = (ai, a‐i), and an idiosyncratic profit
shock,  ifl , which is the firm’s private information and is known to rivals (and the researcher)
only in distribution:

 iflm (ai )   mf ( xl , a)   ifl

(1)

In this incomplete information setup, a firm cannot exactly predict rivals’ actions but it
has rational beliefs about their strategies. For example, suppose firms are homogeneous, then
each firm will make its decision based on its belief about the number of firms that would enter
the market, N m , and its belief that an entering rival will choose a particular location as
represented

by

a

vector

 P   p , p ,..., p  .
m

1

2

Lm

of

conditional

location

choice

probabilities

(CCP),

Pm

For instance, the firm may have a belief that a rival, conditional on

entry, will choose location ‘j’ with probability p j . Hence, for homogeneous firms the expected
profit at location l can be written as (after dropping subscript ‘f’ for format):





E[ ilm ( ai )]   m xl ,  N m , P m    il

(2)

In extant models, firms are allowed to consider all Lm locations in the market so that each
location has some positive probability of being chosen by a firm. However, since firms are not
allowed to set up stores in residential locations, we use our zoning data to exclude such
locations and concentrate only on a subset of potential retail locations, l = {1, 2,…, lm} (Figure 1(b)).
Hence, retailers’ ability to differentiate spatially, and the level of consumers’ search cost, is
driven by the lm zoned locations.
Like Seim (2006), we divide the area around a location into concentric circles or distance
bands. All consumers on a distance band b (b = 1, 2,…, B) around location l are assumed to have

6

the same effect on the firm’s profit. Also, all rivals of a particular format type that are on
distance band b are assumed to have the same competitive effect on the firm. Hence, Equation
(1) can be expanded as follows:
B

B

b 1

b 1

B

 iflm   fb  xlb    f  fb  Ntlbm     f ' fb  N mf ' lb   m   ifl

(3)

b 1 f ' f

where, xlb is a vector of location characteristics like population and per capita income in
distance band b around location l. The impact of these location characteristics (  fb ) on profits is
allowed to be format‐specific as denoted by the subscript ‘f’. The second term on the right hand
m

side of Equation (3) is the intra‐format competition effect where N flb is the number of rivals in
distance band b that have the same format, f, as the focal firm, i, and

 f  fb is the competitive
m

effect of one such rival. Next, is the inter‐format competition effect where N f 'lb is the number of
rivals with format, f’ that is different from the focal firm ( f '  f ), and
effect of one such f’‐format rival. We expect

 f ' fb is the competitive

 f  fb and  f ' fb to fall in magnitude with

increasing b, reflecting lower competition between rivals at greater distances, reflecting the
benefit of spatial differentiation for firm profit. We also expect

 f  fb >  f ' fb to reflect that intra‐

format competition will be lower than inter‐format competition, reflecting the benefit of format
differentiation on firm profit. Finally,  m captures the unobserved attractiveness of the market
that cannot be explained by the observable market characteristics. It would include market
characteristics that are unobserved by the researcher but that are common knowledge for firms
when they make their decision.5

We assume that there are no location‐specific profit unobservables that are common knowledge for firms at the time
of entry but unobservable to the researcher. As we do not have data on major road intersections, and high rents or
tax rates (that are independent of the observed variables such as population), this could lead to potentially biased
estimates. Orhun (2012) considers the importance of allowing for such location specific unobservables.
5
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Firms have rational expectations about rivals’ strategies in equilibrium so that firm i
expects a particular number of f‐format (f’‐format) rivals in distance band b, E  N mf'lb 

 E  N   . Hence, the firm can form expectations about its profit at each location as follows:
m
flb

B

B

b 1

b 1

B

E  iflm    fb  xlbm    f  fb E  N mflb      f ' fb  E  N mf ' lb    m   ifl
E[ N mflb ]   N m  1

where,

(4.1)

b 1 f ' f



j lb

E[ N mf ' lb ]   N m  1



(4.2)

p fj

j lb

(4.3)

pf 'j



Here,  lb is the set of locations in distance band b around location l. p fj p f ' j

 is a conditional

choice probability for store format f (f’) and location j firm. It represents the focal firm’s belief
that a rival firm will open an f‐format (f’‐format) store in location j when a total of N

m

firms

enter the market. Hence, corresponding to f‐format (f’‐format) firms we will have a vector of lm



conditional location choice probabilities, Pfm  p f 1 , p f 2 ,..., p flm

 P  p
m
f'

f '1

, p f '2 ,..., p f ' lm

 .

Hence, for each market, we essentially have a matrix of lm X F conditional format and location
choice probabilities (conditional on N firms entering the market), P m   P1m , P2m ,...PFm  .
m

Now, analogous to Equation (2), we can rewrite Equation (4a) in terms of the total
m

number of entrants, N , a matrix of firm’s beliefs about rivals’ conditional location choice
probabilities, P m , and a set of model parameters,  :

E[ iflm ]  ˆifl  xlbm , N m , P m ;    m   ifl

(5)

Note that  m is common for all store formats as well as across all locations within a

market, and therefore does not influence the location choice after firm i has decided to enter the
market. Thus, if we assume that the private information shock,  ifl , has a i.i.d. type 1 extreme
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value distribution, then the conditional choice probability (conditional on entry) that an
entering firm chooses to open a f‐format store in location l is given by the logit form:

 fl  x , N , P ;  
m
lb

m

exp ˆifl  xlbm , N m , P m ;  

m

lm

exp ˆ   x


F

i j

1 j 1

m
lb

(6)

, N , P ;  
m

m

Next, we normalize the profit from not entering a market to zero so that the entry
probability for a firm is given by the nested logit form:
lm

exp( m ) *  exp ˆi j  xlbm , N m , P m ;  
F

p ( Entry ) 

 1 j 1

(7)

lm

1  exp( ) *  exp ˆi j  xlbm , N m , P m ;  
 1 j 1
F

m

Hence, if there are, say, R potential retail entrants then the expected total number of
entrants in market m is given by:

N m  R * p( Entry )

(8)

Similar to Seim (2006, p. 625-626), we assume that the expected number of entrants in a
market is exactly equal to the number of entrants observed in the data. That is, the market-level
unobserved profit shock,  m , is the lowest value for which the expected number of entrants
predicted by the model, coincides with observed numbers in each market. By exogenously fixing
m

R, and by observing the actual number of entrants, N , the unobserved market attractiveness
parameter,  m , can be therefore estimated using Equations (7) and (8):



lm



j 1



 m N m  ln( N m )  ln( R  N m )  ln   exp ˆ i j  xlbm , N m , P m ;   
F

  1

(9)

We assume that  m is i.i.d. across markets, and follows a normal distribution, N (  ,  2 ) .
Thus the probability that a total of N

m

firms enter the market is given by the p.d.f. of this

normal distribution at the value obtained in Equation (9). Note that the value of  m adjusts to
the size of R in relation to the outside option of no entry. Hence, although the size of R is not
observed by the researcher, varying the size will have only a miniscule effect on our inferences
about firms’ strategies (See discussion in Seim (2006)).
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Now, we can construct the likelihood with the constraint that each firm’s beliefs about
rivals’ strategies must match those rivals’ equilibrium strategies:
lm
M  F

I ( fl ) 
L  P m ,  m ,        fl ( xlbm , N m , P m ; )   *   m ;  , 2  
m 1 


  f 1 l 1

 


Format and Location Choice

s.t.

p fl   fl ( xlbm , N m , P m ; ),





where,  is the set of all model parameters    ,  ,  2

Entry Choice

(10)

l , f , m

 , and

I ( fl ) is an indicator that

equals one if location l is chosen by a f‐format firm, and is zero otherwise.
The constraint in Equation (10) is a system of equations that defines firms’ conditional
location choice probabilities as the fixed point of a continuous mapping between firms’
strategies and their rivals’ strategies. As the conditional location choice probabilities in a market
must add up to 1, by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, this system of equations has at least one
*
solution or fixed point, P  , for any value of  .6

2.2. Estimation Strategy
2.2.1. Simplifying Restrictions
In the general model specification above, the number of model parameters increases
exponentially with the number of format types (F) due to the inter‐format and intra‐format
competition effects. The number of distance bands (B) around each location further explodes the
number of parameters. Specifically, in our empirical application, we have six format types (F =
6), and we consider five 1‐mile width distance bands around each location (B = 5). Therefore, the
number of competition parameters alone is 180 (F2*B = 6*6*5). Given that we only have 100

Like the rest of the entry and location literature, we assume household locations are exogenous to firm choices in
this paper. To the extent, we analyze established markets in which populations and zoning restrictions are stable and
there have been ample opportunities for firms to enter and exit and are in equilibrium before the period of analysis,
our assumption might be reasonable. However, causality could be reversed in newly developing markets, where
consumer growth could lead to new firm/format entry, which could in turn lead to certain types of consumer growth.
We abstract away from these issues in our analysis. If new neighborhoods significantly dominate the data, the effect
of market variables such as population on profits will be overestimated. We thank a reviewer for drawing our
attention to this issue.
6
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sample markets (M) from which to estimate the model, we employ two restrictions to reduce
the number of parameters to be estimated.
First, we assume that the competition effect between a pair of rival formats is symmetric.
That is, for any distance band, b, and for two rivals with formats f and f’, we assume

 f ' fb   f  f 'b . Second, we assume a constant multiplier assumption on the effects across
distance bands. Specifically, we assume that the impact of a factor on market potential at a
particular distance band to be a constant multiplier of the impact of that factor in the first 0‐1
mile distance band.7 For instance, suppose the coefficients of population and per‐capita income
on store profit are denoted by

1fb and  2 fb , respectively; then the restriction implies:

1f 2  1f 1 2 ; 1f 3  1f 1 3 ; ... ; 1fB  1f 1 B
(11.1)

 2 f 2   2 f 1 2 ;  2 f 3   2 f 1 3 ; ... ;  2 fB   2 f 1 B
Similarly for competition, we assume that:

 f  f 2   f  f 1 2 ;  f  f 3   f  f 1 3 ; ...;  f  fB   f  f 1 B
 f ' f 2   f ' f 1 2 ;  f ' f 3   f ' f 1 3 ; ...;  f '  fB   f '  f 1 B

 # competition related parameters



(11.2)

 F *( F  1) / 2   ( B -1) 

2.2.2. Multiple Equilibria
The observed actions of firms in different markets in the data could potentially
correspond to different equilibria. That is, there could be multiple equilibria in the data. Without
any additional information about which equilibrium is favored for each market in the data,
identification is obtained by assuming that every observation in the data comes from the same
equilibrium. This assumption of single equilibrium in the data is common practice in the empirical
literature on games of oligopoly competition, and it implicitly establishes the equilibrium
selection mechanism. Under this condition, estimation involves finding the equilibrium solution,

We did robustness checks for the symmetry and constant multiplier assumptions. Specifically, we tested whether
there might be asymmetric competition effects between Supercenters like Wal‐Mart on other stores. We did not find
significant differences. We also tested whether the distance‐multipliers might be different for supercenters.
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P

*
MLE

*
, *MLE  , which is the global optimum of Equation (10) where, PMLE
is the corresponding

equilibrium CCPs, and MLE is the Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE).
*

Though the model imposes the restriction that the Conditional Choice Probabilities
m

(CCPs), P , for format and location entry should be in equilibrium (Equation 10), we impose
no additional structure to guarantee equilibrium uniqueness. Therefore, there could potentially
be multiple equilibria (CCPs) for the model consistent with the true model parameters,  . Using a
0

nested fixed‐point (NFXP) approach for estimation is computationally demanding as it involves
solving for the fixed‐point of Equation (6) at the trial value of  at each step of the likelihood
maximization. More importantly, for a trial value of  , if Equation (6) has multiple solutions
for CCPs then the likelihood (Equation 10) is not well defined. This is the problem of multiple
equilibria in the model.8 Hence, the NFXP approach is not well adapted to finding the MLE.
The Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) approach developed by Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2007) avoids the problem of multiple equilibria in the model by imposing the equilibrium
condition for CCPs only for the final estimate of  and not for every trial value. The standard
NPL approach starts with an initial guess of the CCPs, and converges to an equilibrium solution
in the limit. For example, in our case, we would start with initial guess values for firms’ beliefs
about rivals’ CCPs, P0 . Then, using Equations (6) through (10) we would obtain the likelihood,

L  P0 ,   . Maximizing the likelihood would give the parameter estimates, 1 . Using these
parameter estimates in Equation (6) would give new CCPs, P1 , that is not necessarily an
equilibrium associated with 1 . This would constitute one iteration and the new CCPs would
be used as a guess for firms’ beliefs about rivals’ actions in the next iteration. The nth iteration of
the standard NPL approach can be denoted by the following contraction mapping:

P ,   P 
n

8

n

n 1

where, n  arg max L  Pn1 ,   ; Pn    Pn1 , n 

(12)



0 , whereas
 , within the

Note that the problem of multiple equilibria in the data is associated with only the true parameter set,

the problem of multiple equilibria in the model is associated with any trial value of the parameter set,
NFXP estimation approach.
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With multiple iterations, if there is convergence, the contraction mapping would





converge to an equilibrium solution or a NPL fixed point, P * , * .
2.2.3. Obtaining the MLE
The MLE is the NPL fixed point that maximizes the likelihood function. However, the
contraction mapping in Equation (12) may not have a unique NPL fixed point, and the standard
NPL approach may not necessarily return the MLE.9 The multiple NPL fixed points are
equilibrium solutions that are essentially the different ‘local optima’ of Equation (10).
Consequently, the NPL iterations may potentially converge to a ‘local optima’ and not the
global optimum. Further, different starting values for P0 may lead to different ‘local optima’.
One option is to spread the search for the global optimum over a wide range of the contraction

 

mapping,  P , by using parallel‐NPL where a large number of NPL algorithms, say, T, are
run in parallel with different starting values. This approach, upon convergence, would give us a





 



set of fixed points (many of which may be identical),  P1* , 1* ; P 2* ,  2* ;...; P T * , T *  .





*
However, it does not guarantee that this set will contain the global optimum, PMLE
, *MLE .

For a more efficient search of the global optimum, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2005)
propose combining the parallel‐NPL with a Genetic Algorithm (GA). GA is a search heuristic
that mimics natural evolution processes such as ‘selection’, ‘crossover’ or ‘reproduction’ and
‘mutation’, and can be used to obtain the global optimum of complex optimization problems.
Combining the parallel‐NPL with GA has two advantages – (1) It spreads the search for the
global optimum over a much wider range of the contraction mapping than what is feasible with
just the parallel‐NPL, and (2) The GA steers the tracks of the parallel‐NPL iterations towards
those regions of the contraction mapping that are more likely to contain the global optimum.10

Different NPL fixed points will give different likelihood values. Under the assumption of single equilibrium in the
data, the interpretation of a NPL fixed point is that every observation in the data comes from that particular
equilibrium.
10 Su and Judd (2007) suggest using a Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints approach that finds
the parameter estimates and the equilibrium CCPs simultaneously. However, like the parallel‐NPL, this approach
also relies on multiple runs with different starting values to find different equilibria. Hence, its ability to find the
global optimum in problems that have a large action space (as in our entry and location choice problem) is unclear.
9
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2.2.4. Convergence
The algorithm may not converge to the global optimum if the contraction mapping does
not have good local convergence properties around the global optimum. Kasahara and
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have the same fixed‐point solution(s). An

appropriate value of  can modify the concavity or convexity of the mapping such that the
transformed mapping is Locally Contractive around the fixed point and will converge even if the
original mapping does not.11

Finally, even when the mapping does converge, the rate of

convergence could be extremely slow and may require a large number of iterations. To avoid
this, Kasahara and Shimotsu (2008) propose the following q‐stage operator called q‐NPL:
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also has the locally contractive property of  P ,  . Hence, in our

estimation, we replace the standard NPL operator,  , with the Locally Contractive, q‐NPL
operator,  q . The resulting parallel NPL iterations are then combined with GA as described
above. This procedure searches efficiently over the space of possible equilibria and converges
fast to a set of equilibria which almost certainly contains the global optimum. To the best of our
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are less than one.

: Simulate a sequence

  0.1, 0.2,..., 0.9 . Then

across n = 1,…, N.

knowledge, this is the first empirical application of this procedure to speed convergence. Details
of the sequence of steps involved in estimation are provided in Appendix A.
3. Data
3.1 Sample Markets
An empirical analysis of firms’ strategic entry, location and format decisions requires an
appropriate set of sample markets. A market must be large enough to not only accommodate
multiple competing firms of different formats, but also for the possibility of spatial
differentiation among the entering firms. Yet, there is little value in studying spatial
competition in too large a spatial market where firms would locate far away from each other
(for grocery stores spatial competition falls off rapidly beyond 3 miles). In our application for
big‐box grocery retailers, extremely small towns and villages or large areas such as Census
Metropolitan Statistical Areas are therefore not useful to be defined as a market. Further, towns
and cities with very high population tend to have very complex zoning regulations such as sub‐
division zoning which cannot be inferred from our zoning data. Also, these large and dense
markets usually have multiple stores of a retail chain requiring us to identify individual
retailers and distinguish cannibalization effects from competition effects. Finally, clusters of
towns, and suburbs of large cities like Chicago make it difficult to define a market boundary
that reasonably separates retailers and consumers within a geographical area, where the market
is self‐contained, in being able to clearly define who are the consumers ‘inside’ a market and
who are rivals ‘outside’ the market.
Given these challenges, we employ the following two criteria in selecting markets for
analysis: (1) Single towns and town pairs with populations ranging from 20,000 – 250,000
people; (2) isolated markets that do not have another city or town within a 10 mile radius. Based
on these criteria, we selected a set of 100 markets (i.e., M = 100) across several U.S. states.12
Figure 2 shows the spread of markets in our sample across the entire U.S. Table 1 lists
descriptive statistics for our sample markets.

Increasing the number of markets increases the computational burden, but with only marginal improvements in
the precision of model parameters.
12
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3.2 Consumers, Grocery Retailers, and their Locations
Our empirical application corresponds to the year 2008 as we have grocery store location
data for that year. Data on market characteristics are obtained from the U.S. Census. Although
detailed demographic data at a Census Block Group (CBG) level are available only for the year
2000, the U.S. Census provides annual census projections for the county level. Hence, we project
the CBG level census data to their 2008 values by the proportion of change in the respective
counties between 2000 and 2008. As we do not have information about consumers beyond the
CBG level, we follow the convention in the literature and place consumers in a CBG at the
population‐weighted center of the CBG. These are our consumer locations.
Geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude) of big‐box grocery stores for 2008, and
the store formats, are obtained from Nielsen’s ‘Trade Dimensions’. In 2008, our 100 sample
markets had altogether 751 big‐box grocery stores. These stores have been classified into six
format types (i.e., F = 6): Supermarkets (SM), Superstores (SS), Supercenters and Wholesale Clubs
(SC), Limited Assortment and Warehouse stores (LA), Natural Foods stores (NF) and Food and Drug
stores (FD).13 Table 2 provides a description of these store formats.
For the location choice game, we divide a market into a uniform grid of discrete 1 sq.
mile blocks or market locations. Our 100 sample markets have a total of 7,216 such locations. But
zoning regulations dictate which of these locations are available for big‐box retailers. Below, we
discuss our approach for identifying these retail locations and their commercial centers. Just as
consumers are placed at the population‐weighted center of CBGs, we place retailers within a
retail location at the commercial center of the location.
Our concept of market locations differs from the standard approach in earlier research
that treats census divisions as market locations and places retail stores at the population‐
weighted center along with consumers. The standard approach simplifies the data setup
process but it has severe drawbacks: (1) The population‐weighted center of a census division is
likely to be a residential zone so that placing retail stores there would confound the inclusion of
zoning regulations; (2) Stores are rarely present in the interior of a census division, rather, they
Many chains operate multiple formats (e.g., Safeway, Vons Market, Target, etc.), hence our assumption that chains
can choose the optimal format for each location is reasonable. However, we note that a few chains operate only one
format (e.g., Whole Foods operates only as a Natural Food store).
13
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are present on roads that border these census divisions; (3) Census divisions vary extensively in
size so that, for large census divisions, stores may be located quite far from the center. In
contrast, our approach allows us to incorporate spatial zoning, and it avoids major distortions
of the distances between competitors and the distances of stores from population centers. Note
that we use Great Circle distance as the distance between any two points.
We next describe the National Land Cover Dataset (NLCD) and discuss how it is used in
conjunction with Geographical Information System tools such as ArcGIS and Google Earth to
recover the potential retail locations and their commercial centers.
3.3 Spatial Zoning Data
Multi‐Resolution Land Characteristics Consortium, a conglomerate of several federal
agencies, has created two NLCD datasets that provide consistent and accurate digital land‐
cover information for the coterminous U.S. The first national land‐cover mapping project,
NLCD 1992, was derived from the early to mid‐1990s Landsat Thematic Mapper satellite data. It
applied a 21‐class, geo‐referenced, land‐cover classification (see Vogelmann et al., 2001). The
second project, NLCD 2001, updated the data for the year 2001 (see Homer et al., 2004). Both
datasets have a spatial resolution of 30 meters. That is, every 30 sq. meter area of land is
classified as a specific land type (e.g., deciduous forest, grassland, open water, etc.) and is
allocated one pixel point with a distinct color code and the associated latitude and longitude.14
Interestingly, the land type classifications include residential and commercial land. Residential
land is further classified into low and high intensity residential land, and commercial land
comprises of highly developed areas that do not include residential areas. We use the NLCD
data in the following three steps to identify the potential retail locations.
Step 1: Constructing Market Boundaries and Market Locations:
We use the data in NLCD 2001 to construct the market boundaries of our sample
markets. The residential and commercial land area pixel points in each market are projected on
a map by using the ArcGIS software. This gives us the spatial area of interest for a market. A
simple visual inspection of the pixel density is used to construct the market boundaries where
A pixel point is one of the individual dots that make up a graphical image. Each pixel point combines red, green,
and blue phosphors to create a specific color.
14
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the pixels fade away (See Figure 3(a)). As our sample markets are reasonably isolated from
other towns and cities, we can be flexible in choosing the shape of their boundaries. A
rectangular shape is preferred so that a market can be easily divided into a uniform grid of
discrete blocks or market locations. Thus, we construct imaginary rectangular borders (L miles X
H miles where L and H are integers that vary across markets) around the residential and
commercial pixel points of each market and then divide the market, specifically, into 1 sq. mile
locations (See Figure 3(b)).
Step 2: Commercial Activity and Commercial Center in a Location:
The extent of commercial activity in a location (as defined above) could affect firms’
profit in the location if consumers have a preference for multi‐purpose shopping or one‐stop
shopping. For instance, when shopping for groceries, consumers may like to combine their
shopping trip with non‐grocery purchases such as clothing and electronics so that locations
with more retail businesses may be more attractive to firms. We isolate the NLCD 2001 pixel
points that correspond to commercial land with retail businesses (See Appendix B for more
details) and use the number of pixel points in a location as a measure for the extent of commercial
activity in that location. The mean of the latitudes and longitudes of the commercial land pixel
points in a location gives us the commercial center of the location (See Figure 3(c)). We place all
retail stores within a location at the commercial center of that location. We prefer the
commercial center to the geographical center for the placement of retail stores also because the
commercial center is likely to coincide with unobservables such as the positions of major road

intersections within the 1 square mile block locations.
Step 3: Discerning Potential Retail Locations from other Commercial Locations:
The market locations that contain the commercial land pixel points are the commercial
locations and they constitute a very small share of all market locations. The locations without
any commercial activity are mostly residential locations and some barren land. Hence, we
account for residential zoning by excluding locations that do not have any commercial land
pixel points. But even within commercial locations, not all locations may be open to big‐box
retailers. For instance, some commercial zones like, say, downtown areas, might only allow
small businesses such as banks and restaurants. An obvious candidate for a potential retail
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location for big‐box stores is any commercial location that has at least one big‐box store‐‐ this
could be either a grocery or non‐grocery store. Hence, we project the locations on to Google Earth
and use a tool called ‘Places Categories’ which shows the locations of various types of businesses
in a region (See Figure 3(d)). We manually combed through the commercial locations, and
specifically checked for the presence of major retail stores, major grocery stores and shopping
centers to identify the commercial locations that have at least one big‐box store.
Now, the absence of any type of big‐box store in a commercial location does not
necessarily imply that such stores are not allowed in that location. In particular, a commercial
location that is open to big‐box stores may not have any such store if it is in an unfavorable or
poor neighborhood and cannot support a big store. As we do not have a precise method for
identifying such locations, we use the following heuristic.

For each market, we find the

minimum value of the total income of consumers within a 2‐mile radius of the commercial
locations that have big‐box stores.15 We use this minimum as a benchmark for a commercial
location in the market to be attractive enough to support at least one big‐box retail store. That is,
if a commercial location does not have any big‐box store and the total income of consumers
within a 2‐mile radius of the location is less than the market benchmark, then we presume that
the absence of a big‐box store is due to the unattractiveness of the location and not necessarily
because of zoning restrictions. Hence, a commercial location with no big‐box store is still treated
as a potential retail location when the following condition is satisfied:

Income in 2-mile radius of a commercial
location that has no big-box store

≤

 Income in 2-mile radius of a commercial 
min 

location that has a big-box store
 16

To summarize, we use the NLCD data to construct market boundaries so that each
market can be divided into a grid of 1 sq. mile locations. Then the commercial land pixel points
are used to obtain the extent of commercial activity in a location and also to locate the

Our results are robust to using radii of 1, 2 and 3 miles.
This procedure may exclude some locations in high‐income neighborhoods that are above the income benchmark,
but are actually available for big‐box retailers. To the extent, our criterion checks for any type of big‐box store
(grocery or non‐grocery stores), such errors are likely infrequent, with little impact on estimates. The procedure may
also include locations in low‐income neighborhoods that are below the income benchmark even though in reality big‐
box stores are not allowed in such locations. Such erroneous inclusion of low population or low per capita income
locations would cause overestimation of the positive profit impact of these variables.
15
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commercial center of the location. Extant models that do not account for zoning, assume that
firms are allowed to set up stores in any market location. In contrast, we account for residential
zoning by excluding locations that do not have any commercial land pixel points. Finally, we
account for zoning regulations particularly against big‐box retailers, within commercial
locations, by defining potential retail locations as those commercial locations that (1) have at
least one big‐box store which is either a grocery or a non‐grocery store, and (2) do not have a
big‐box store and are in a poor neighborhood which is below the market benchmark as
described above.
4. Results
We begin with a descriptive analysis of the data before reporting the results of the
structural model estimation.
4.1 Descriptive Analysis
The descriptive analysis has two objectives. First, we test for empirical evidence in
support of the theoretical conjectures about how tightened spatial restrictions impact retail
entry and format variety without any model restrictions. Second, we estimate the correlations
between zoning restrictions and factors affecting market potential and competitive intensity to
obtain guidance on the expected magnitude and direction of the potential bias from omitting
zoning restrictions.
The link between spatial and format differentiation
We report the relationship between zoning restrictions and the number of competing
stores in the 5 mi. radius of a given big‐box grocery store in Table 3(a).17 We operationalize
zoning restrictiveness with two variables: (1) proportion of area that is available for entry in the
5 mile radius of a store (Proportion of Available Area); and (2) proportion of that available area

Popular business press articles suggest that the trade radius of a Supermarket is typically about 2‐3 miles and for a
Supercenter like Wal‐Mart supercenter it is about 5‐7 miles. We tested with different trading radii around a given
store and obtained similar results.
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which is concentrated within a 3 mile radius of the store (Proportion within 3mi.) – ceteris
paribus, a higher value of Proportion within 3mi. indicates a spatially tighter zoning around the
central location or a lesser scope for spatial differentiation.18 Controlling for population and per‐
capita income, we find an insignificant relationship for Proportion Available Area, but Proportion
within 3mi. has a negative and significant impact, consistent with the theory that tightened
zoning restrictions significantly reduce entry.
We report the relationship between zoning restrictions on format concentration (the
opposite of format variety) in Table 3(b). We operationalize format concentration through a
metric that is similar to the Herfindahl‐Hirschman Index (HHI); i.e., we use the sum of squares
of shares of the six different grocery store formats. Hence, a higher value for format HHI would
imply a greater format concentration and less format variety. We find a negative and significant
relationship between format concentration and Proportion Available Area; i.e., loose zoning
restrictions allow a large variety of stores to enter. Further, there is a negative and significant
relationship between format concentration and Proportion within 3mi.; showing that controlling
for the available area, format variety increases with tighter zoning restrictions as predicted by
the theory.
Collectively, these results demonstrate that zoning restrictions do negatively impact
retail entry and format concentration. Further, given an available area for entry, and controlling
for the number of entrants, tightening zoning restrictions that prevent firms to spatially
differentiate (i.e., Proportion within 3mi.), causes greater format differentiation and variety.
Overall, the results support the theory that firms will respond to the inability to spatially
differentiate through product (format) differentiation. Given this descriptive evidence, we will
further explore the predictive implications of zoning restrictions for entry and format variety
through counterfactual simulations based on estimates from a structural model of entry,
location and format choice.

Let the total area within the 5 miles radius of store be approximated as 75 square miles (approximation of  * 5 ).
Suppose 25 square miles of this area are available, then Proportion Available Area = 0.3. Suppose 20 square miles of this
available area is concentrated within the 3 mile radius, then Proportion within 3 mile = 0.8.
2
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Potential Biases due to Omission of Zoning
We next discuss our expectations about the type of biases due omission of zoning
restrictions. We report the histogram of the point‐biserial correlation between zoning
restrictions and demographic variables such as population and per‐capita income for the 100
sample markets in Figure 4. The figure indicates that there is substantial heterogeneity in the
correlations. In the aggregate, the mean correlation with distance‐weighted population in a 5
mile radius is 0.1219 (Std. deviation = 0.1993) and mean correlation with distance‐weighted PCI
is ‐0.0889 (Std. deviation = 0.1849). Thus on average, commercial zoned locations are slightly
positively (negatively) correlated with distance‐weighted population (distance‐weighted PCI).
Hence, when zoning is omitted, the presence of retailers closer to (farther from) locations with
high population (PCI) may be misattributed to a stronger (weaker) effect of population (PCI) on
store profits. That is, a model that omits zoning is likely to overestimate (underestimate) the
effect of population (PCI). Nevertheless, as the standard deviations indicate, there is lot of
variation in the extent of correlation in different markets; this suggests that the bias at the level
of each market would be different, and only accommodating actual zoning restrictions at the
market level would help evaluate the correct counterfactuals.
The impact of omitted zoning on the estimates of spatial competition parameters is
harder to predict. Consider the following stylized specification for firms’ profit at a location

   0  1 X   2 N  3 Z  
where X includes market characteristics like population and income, N is the number of
competitors at the location, and, for the purpose of this illustration, Z is an indicator for zoning
such that Z = 0 if zoning restricts entry into the location and Z = 1 otherwise. The competition
parameter,  2 , will be negative, and  3 will be positive. If zoning is omitted, we would estimate
the mis‐specified model

   0  1 X   2 N   *
where the error term,  *  3 Z   , includes the omitted zoning variable. Then the bias in the
estimate of the competition parameter will have the same sign as   NZ   XZ *  XN  where ij is
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the correlation between variables i and j.19 As competitors do not exist in locations where entry
is restricted, we have  NZ  0 . Now, if zoning restrictions are not related to market
characteristics then  XZ  0 , and the bias is positive. That is, in this case, the competition effect
will be underestimated. However, if zoning restricts entry into locations with higher population
and income then  XZ  0 . Also, due to the absence of competitors in such locations, we may
find that  XN  0 . Then, depending on the relative magnitudes of  NZ and  XZ *  XN , the bias
can be positive (i.e., competition effect will be underestimated) or negative (i.e., competition
effect will be overestimated). Hence, the actual bias on competition effects will depend on how
zoning is related to the incomes and populations in the market.
4.2 Structural Model Estimates
Our search for the MLE by combining parallel‐NPL with GA led to a set of identical
NPL fixed points, which suggests that for our empirical application the model has a unique
equilibrium solution or a unique NPL fixed point, which is also the MLE. We first discuss the
results with homogeneous retailers where we do not distinguish between different grocery
store formats similar to Seim (2006), before considering the model with heterogeneous retailers
that can differentiate on formats.
Homogeneous Retailers
In this model, we ignore firms’ store format choice and assume that they only make
entry and location choice decisions. This case is similar to the application in Seim (2006). Recall
that the area around each location is divided into five distance bands of 1 mile widths (0‐1mi., 1‐
2mi, 2‐3mi., 3‐4mi. and 4‐5mi.). For the observable market characteristics that affect store profit
in a location we use population (Pop) and per capita income (PCI) of consumers in the different
distance bands around the location, and the extent of commercialization (Commercialization) at
the location. Table 4 presents the parameter estimates with zoning restrictions (Column 1) and
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 2 is given by Hanushek and Jackson (1977) as
    XZ *  XN  *  Z ,  is the correlation between variables i
b  NZ
2
1   XN
 N ij

Under the misspecified model, the expected value for

E   2    2  3b
and j, and

i

where the bias

is standard deviation of variable i.
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without zoning restrictions (Column 2), where retailers can set up stores anywhere in a market.
In both cases, the potential number of entrants (R) in each market is fixed at 25. Selecting a
different value for R only alters the distribution of the unobserved market attractiveness
parameter,  m , but with negligible difference in the substantive results.
Not accounting for zoning generally gives downward biased estimates. Without zoning,
commercialization has a higher coefficient because firm choice of location is attributed to the
value of commercialization, rather than the fact that one can locate the store only in these zoned
areas. As discussed above, available locations in our sample markets are positively correlated
with population and slightly negatively correlated with per capita income (PCI). Hence, as
expected, when zoning is omitted, the model overestimates the profit impact of population
(1.626 without zoning versus 1.167 with zoning in the 0‐1 mile band) and slightly
underestimates the impact of PCI (0.623 without zoning versus 0.766 with zoning in the 0‐1 mile
band). Nevertheless, in both cases the profit impact of population and PCI decrease gradually
with distance.
Like the impact of market characteristics, the spatial competition effect between rivals
also decreases dramatically with distance. This signifies the benefit of spatial differentiation. In
terms of bias, as expected the effects are mixed. We find that the competition effect at short
distances within 0‐1 mile is overestimated (‐0.878 without zoning versus ‐0.615 with zoning)
when we omit zoning. In contrast, the competition effect at moderate distances of 1‐2 miles, say,
is underestimated (‐0.139 without zoning versus ‐0.221 with zoning). Finally, when we do not
control for zoning, low entry into markets with more restrictive zoning is explained away by a
low value for the unobserved market fixed effect (Mean value of  m is ‐7.2827 without zoning
versus ‐6.603 with zoning).
4.3 Inter‐format and Intra‐format Competition
We next consider heterogeneous retailers where firms make endogenous entry, location
and store format choices. We classify grocery stores into six format types (i.e., F = 6):
Supermarkets (SM), Superstores (SS), Limited Assortment and Warehouse stores (LA), Natural Foods
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stores (NF), Food and Drug stores (FD) and Supercenters and Wholesale Clubs (SC). We again fix
the potential number of entrants (R) at 25. Tables 5(a) and 5(b) present the parameter estimates
for the cases with and without zoning, respectively.20
We can see that the impact of the observable market characteristics is different for
different store formats. For instance, Table 5(a) shows that unlike the other formats, Supercenters
are not attracted towards locations with high population rather they are more sensitive to
population at farther distances of 2‐4 miles, perhaps because of the high cost of operating this
large format in densely populated areas and also because Supercenters are likely to draw
shoppers from farther distances. Similarly, consumers’ per capita income has a much greater
positive impact on the store profit of Superstores than that of Supermarkets and Supercenters.
Hence, the attractiveness of locations within a market varies across store formats. A comparison
of the estimates again shows that ignoring zoning overestimates the impact of population and
underestimates the impact of PCI.
The spatial competition parameter estimates in Table 5(a) reveal some interesting
insights. First, in general, intra‐format competition is greater than inter‐format competition
effects. A notable exception is that Supermarkets compete more intensely with Supercenters
(competition effect at 0‐1 mi. = ‐2.188) than with other Supermarkets (competition effect at 0‐1 mi.
= ‐1.842). This effect is consistent with the conventional wisdom that the arrival of larger stores
may have significant asymmetric impact on smaller stores. Finally, some inter‐format effects are
positive. This effect is consistent with the conventional wisdom that consumers may wish to
shop at stores of different formats: they may shop mostly at a supercenter and then shop at a
close by natural food store or limited assortment store for select products—suggesting
agglomeration benefits. 21

Some of the inter‐format competition parameters are even positive

which indicates that certain store formats gain some agglomeration benefits when they locate
close to a rival with a different format. For example, the Limited Assortment stores benefit from

Based on results from preliminary estimations, we estimate separate coefficients for population at different
distances for the Supercenter format, but common population‐distance multipliers (Equation (11.1)) for the other
formats. However PCI‐distance multipliers were not different for different formats; hence we report results with
common multipliers for PCI.
21 An alternative explanation is unobservable to researcher location shocks (e.g., favorable road intersections or low
rents) that may be observable to retailers. We thank a reviewer for suggesting this alternative explanation.
20

25

locating close to Supercenters (1.644) and Food and Drug stores (0.790). The multiplier parameters
for the different distance bands again indicate that the competition effect decreases with
distance from rivals.
Again omission of zoning leads to bias in competition parameters, with the direction of
the bias mixed. Comparing with Table 5(b), we again see that omission of zoning
underestimates the competition effect between rivals at moderate distances of 1‐4 miles.
However, several of the inter‐format competition effects at short distances (0‐1 mile) get
overestimated, while most of the intra‐format competition effects and the relatively high
negative inter‐format competition effects are underestimated.

5. Counterfactual Simulations
We perform two sets of counterfactuals. First we assess how constraining the area
available for retail entry through zoning affects retail entry and format variety. Second, we
assess how certain prototypical zoning arrangements such as centralized zoning, neighborhood
zoning and outskirt zoning impact format variety.
Effect of Zoning Restrictions on Entry and Format Variety
To investigate the impact of greater zoning restrictions on firms’ entry decisions and
format variety, we generate 100, 8mi. X 8mi., hypothetical markets each of which is divided into
sixty‐four 1 sq. mile block locations. Values for Population, PCI and commercial activity are
randomly assigned to each market location. Starting with no zoning restrictions (i.e., all 64
locations in each market are available for retailers), we gradually increase zoning restrictions in
these markets and explore the influence of zoning on market structure. For this, we reduce the
number of locations that are available for retailers in a market in steps of one location. At each
step, the new location that is ‘zoned out’ is randomly selected in each market so that at any step
the scope for spatial differentiation varies across markets.
As we gradually increase zoning restrictions, we calculate firms’ entry probability in
each market and the equilibrium location and format choice probabilities. Note that given
model parameter estimates, and the equilibrium number of firms that enter a market, the fixed
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point solution of Equation 6 will give us the equilibrium conditional location and format choice
probabilities. We use the nested fixed point approach for this calculation.22 Now, to obtain the
equilibrium number of firms that enter a market, we calculate the entry probability using
Equation 7. For this, we need the unobserved market‐specific components,  m . We fix  m for
our simulated markets by using Equation 9 and assuming that when there are no zoning
restrictions ten out of twenty‐five potential entrants ( N m = 10; R = 25) can enter each market.
Figure 5(a) plots the average entry probabilities for our simulated markets when
markets are heterogeneous. For this we use the estimates in Table 5(a). We see that entry
probabilities decrease when fewer market locations are available to retailers. Consequently, the
equilibrium number of retailers that can enter these markets decreases rapidly from ten firms
when all sixty‐four locations are available to five firms when only sixteen locations are
available; i.e., when the share of commercial zoned locations is only 25% of the market area, the
number of firms fall by 50%.
We next explore how format differentiation can mitigate the entry deterring effect of
zoning. For this we compare the entry probabilities for heterogeneous firms (all six store
formats) with that under the assumptions of (a) partial heterogeneity where an entering firm
can choose from one of three formats – Supermarket, Limited Assortment and Food and Drug, and
(b) homogeneity where an entering firm can only setup a store with the Supermarket format.
Now when zoning restrictions increase in markets, the entry probabilities drop at a faster rate
under partial heterogeneity as the scope for spatial differentiation as well as format
differentiation are limited. The drop in entry probabilities is even faster under homogeneity.
This is shown in Figure 5(b) where we see that a greater heterogeneity on the format dimension
increases the entering firms’ ability to withstand greater zoning restrictions. For instance, in the
case of heterogeneous firms, as we reduce the number of available market locations from 46 to
34, the average number of market entrants continues to remain fixed at 8 firms. But in the case

To deal with potential multiple equilibria in the model, we solved for the nested fixed point(s) for each market by
starting with 1000 different guess values for the matrix of location and format choice probabilities. In roughly 95% of
the cases, we obtain unique equilibria for all guess values. For the remaining cases where they converge to different
equilibria, we take the average choice probabilities over the 1000 fixed point solutions.
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of homogeneous firms, the number of firms dropped to 7 when the number of available
locations was reduced to 39. Further, when the number of available locations falls to 8, i.e.,
12.5% of the available area, the number of entrants under heterogeneity (4 entrants) is 50% more
than when there is only partial heterogeneity (3 entrants) and 100% more than when there is
homogeneity (2 entrants).
We next evaluate how the format mix or variety changes with greater zoning
restrictions. We measure format concentration in a market through a metric that is similar to the
Herfindahl‐Hirschman Index (HHI). Specifically, we use the sum of squares of shares of the six
different store formats in a market to obtain the following HHI of format concentration for a
given number of entering firms:

 lm

HHI  N      p fl  N m  
f 1  l 1

F

2

m

(15)

A lower value for this HHI indicates a lower concentration of any single store format in
the market or a greater format variety in the market. As shown in Figure 5(c), we find that as
zoning restrictions in markets increase, for large ranges of zoning restrictions the average HHI
of format concentration decreases while the number of entrants remains fixed. For instance, as
the number of available locations in the 8mi. X 8mi. markets drops from 32 (50% of the market)
to 24 (37.5% of the market), the HHI of format concentration decreases from 0.2203 to 0.2193
while the number of entering firms remains unchanged at seven. Hence, firms resort to format
differentiation to mitigate the entry deterrent effect of zoning. Our results demonstrate that
citizens and local governments making zoning decisions to restrict the available locations for
retailers will not only reduce the number of retailers available to shop, but can also impact the
type of shopping formats available to the citizenry.
Prototypical Zoning Arrangements: Centralized, Neighborhood and Outskirt Zoning
We consider three prototypical zoning arrangements and how it impacts format variety:
“centralized,” “neighborhood,” and “outskirt” zoning. Centralized zoning seeks to mimic a
zoning arrangement where commercial locations are restricted to a town center; neighborhood
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zoning seeks to mimic an arrangement where commercial locations are restricted to the centers
of local neighborhoods, while outskirt zoning seeks to mimic a zoning arrangement where
commercial locations are restricted to the periphery of the town. These arrangements differ in
the extent to which firms can spatially differentiate.
As before we take 8 mi. X 8 mi. markets with sixty‐four 1 sq. mile locations, but create
zoning restrictions consistent with the three prototypical zoning arrangements. To control for
availability of locations across the three zoning arrangements, we allow entry into only sixteen
of the available 64 locations in all arrangements. Those sixteen locations are distributed in the
three arrangements as shown in Figure 5(d). The sixteen locations are divided into four 2mi X
2mi. retail zones that are at the periphery (Z1: Outskirt Zoning) or at the center of
neighborhoods (Z2: Neighborhood Zoning) or at the center of the market (Z3: Centralized
Zoning). Similar to our previous counterfactual, we assume that five firms enter a market,
irrespective of the zoning pattern.
Figure 5(e) shows that as the zoning pattern changes from outskirt to centralized, the more
popular, Supermarket, Supercenter and Food and Drug store formats lose market share whereas
Limited Assortment and the Superstore formats gain share with centralized zoning.23 Effectively,
the HHI of format concentration decreases from 0.2324 under outskirt zoning to 0.2115 under
centralized zoning.
Overall, we conclude that centralized zoning leads to greater format variety with a
number of smaller formats, relative to outskirt zoning which leads to more homogeneous larger
format zoning. Our results should inform recent debates about the homogenization of retail
formats as towns open up peripheral locations for development of big‐box retailers.

6. Conclusion
The literature on retailer entry and location choices has thus far ignored the spatial
zoning regulations that impact entry and location decisions. Taking advantage of a publicly

The Natural Food format also gains a small amount of market share but it is not shown here for ease of exposition
because it has a very small share compared to the other store formats
23
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available, digital land cover database, NLCD, we are able to study the effect of zoning on entry,
location and format choices. We estimate a static, structural, simultaneous move game model of
entry, location and format choice with incomplete information using data on the observed
choices of big‐box grocery store retailers in a national sample of markets. We use recent
advances in the empirical estimation literature of discrete games to address issues of multiple
equilibria in the model and data as well as problems due to slow convergence of the estimation
algorithm.
Our analysis leads to the following key takeaways: First, zoning reduces entry because
the inability to spatially differentiate increases competition and reduces profitability and the
number of firms a market can support. However, since inter‐format competition is much less
intense than intra‐format competition, firms resort to format differentiation in equilibrium and
thus mitigate the entry deterrent effect of zoning significantly. In fact, for some ranges of zoning
restrictions, the number of firms that enter may be 50% more than when firms can differentiate
on formats relative to when they cannot.
Second, for large ranges of zoning restrictions, which limit the ability to spatially
differentiate, there may be no changes in the number of firms in the market, but only changes in
the retail mix of formats. This has implications for empirical work, because one may see little
changes in entry in response to zoning restrictions and thus may misinterpret the result as
zoning having no impact on retailer choices, especially when retailers can differentiate on
formats. We have also shown that for any given area available for retail entry, the spatial
distribution of the available locations matters for the type of store formats in the market.
Specifically, centralized zoning allows for greater format variety, while outskirt zoning leads to
lower format variety, with neighborhood zoning at an intermediate level of format variety. This
insight on the link between zoning, spatial differentiation and format differentiation is not only
important for retailers, but also for city planners who seek to encourage retail format variety in
their markets through their zoning authority.
Finally, we find that ignoring spatial zoning regulations in estimating entry and location
models, causes serious underestimation of the impact of market characteristics like population
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and income on store profit potential. It also leads to bias in the true intensity of spatial
competition between rivals. The net effect of these biases is that retailers’ willingness to enter a
market and their propensity to differentiate on formats are underestimated.
We next discuss some key limitations in this paper that warrant future research. First,
we abstract away from the fact that entry and location decisions have been made over time and
treat entry and location decisions within a static equilibrium framework. A dynamic analysis
requires better data (timing of entry and exits). The dynamic analysis becomes practically
infeasible in modeling spatial differentiation at a micro‐level of 1 square miles, because of the
explosion in state space. However given the fineness of zoning regulations and the need to
model spatial differentiation carefully, such a detailed modeling of location choices becomes
critical. Second, we have treated store entry decisions across markets as independent, unlike
recent work by Jia (2008), who models the chain entry decision, taking into account the
interdependence across markets. However, her modeling approach is restricted to a small
number of competing chains and is hard to extend to our grocery market setting that involves a
large number of players. These important issues await future research.
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Figu
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Figure 4(a): Histogram of (market‐level) point‐biserial correlations between locations available
for entry and distance‐weighted population within 5mi. of the location

Figure 4(b): Histogram of (market‐level) point‐biserial correlations between locations available
for entry and distance‐weighted per‐capita income within 5mi. of the location
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Figure 5(a): Equilibrium number of entrants: E[Nm] = k iff k/25 ≤ Entry Prob(Nm = k) and
(k+1)/25 > Entry Prob(Nm = k+1). As zoning restrictions increase, the equilibrium number of
heterogeneous firms that enter a market (E[Nm]) decreases.

Figure 5(b): As zoning restrictions increase, the equilibrium number of entrants decreases faster
when store formats are more homogeneous.
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Figure 5(c): Firms resort to greater format differentiation (lower HHI) under more restrictive
zoning such that the equilibrium number of entrants may not change for large ranges of zoning
restrictions.

Figure 5(d): Counterfactual exercise for three prototypical zoning patterns. In each case, 16 (out
of 64) locations are available for retailers, and five retailers are assumed to enter a market.
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Figure 5(e): Share of store formats and HHI of format concentration under different
prototypical zoning patterns.

Z1: Outskirt Zoning

(HHI = 0.2324)

Z2: Neighborhood Zoning (HHI = 0.2206)
Z3: Centralized Zoning

(HHI = 0.2115)

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of 100 Sample Markets

Mean

Maximum

Minimum

84.8

249.7

20.7

17.2

26.7

10.9

73

225

16

7.5

21

2

1.3

9

0

2.8

12

1

Number of store formats

4

6

2

Proportion of market area
zoned for retail stores

0.437

0.812

0.119

Population (in 1000s)
scaled to 2007‐08
Per Capita Income (in $ 1000s)
scaled to 2007‐08
Area (in sq. miles)
(= Number of discrete 1 sq.
mile locations in a market)
Number of big‐box grocery
stores
Number of rival stores in
0‐2 miles of a grocery store
Number of rival stores in
2‐4 miles of a grocery store
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Various Grocery Store Formats
Store Format

Supermarket
(SM)

Superstore
(SS)

Ltd. Assort.
(LA)

Natural Food
(NF)

Food + Drug
(FD)

Supercenter
(SC)

Examples of
Retailers25

Hi‐Low Food
Stores, Price
Chopper, Vons
Market

Jewel Food
Store, BI‐LO,
Vons Market,
Albertsons,
Safeway,

Save‐A‐Lot,
Price Rite, Aldi,
Smart & Final

Whole Foods,
Trader Joes

Jewel‐Osco,
Kroger,
Albertsons,
Safeway

Wal‐Mart
Supercenter,
Super Target,
Meijer, Sams
Club, Costco

Total Number of
Stores in 100
Sample Markets

164

106

127

39

189

126

Maximum
Number of Stores
in a Market

8

4

6

3

7

5

Average Store
Area
(in sq. feet)

13,500

35,500

14,500

10,500

41,500

163,000

Average Annual
Store Revenue
from Grocery
Sales (in $ M)

5.93

15.24

5.23

9.22

16.09

51.84

Average Ratio of
Grocery Revenue
to Total Store
Revenue

1

1

1

1

0.71

0.62

Some retailers have more than one format (e.g., Vons, Albertsons, and Safeway). We follow the format classification of individual stores provided by AC
Nielsen.
25
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Table 3: OLS Regressions (Preliminary Analyses) for Impact of Zoning on (a) Number of
Competing Stores, and (b) Format Concentration, within 5mi. of a Grocery Store
Variable
Intercept
Population (10,000s)
Per‐capita Income ($10,000)
Proportion Available Area
Proportion within 3 mi.
Number of Rivals
Number of Rivals2
R‐Sq

3(a): Dependent Variable =
Number of Competing Big‐
Box Grocery Stores
0.172
1.312***
1.198***
0.307
‐2.035***
‐
‐
79.4%

3(b): Dependent Variable =
HHI of Grocery Store Format
Concentration
0.792***
‐0.007*
‐0.042***
‐0.132***
‐0.063**
‐0.068***
0.003***
50.8%

(Notes ‐ *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01; All significant estimates in bold)

Table 4: Homogeneous retailers with and without controlling for zoning

Variable
Commercialization

Population
coefficients

Per Capita
Income
coefficients

Competition
Effect coefficients

  
  

Column 1
(Estimates with Zoning;
# Retail Locations = 2853)
0.103***

Column 2
(Estimates without Zoning;
# Retail Locations = 7216)
0.199***

0‐1mi.

1.167***

1.626***

1‐2mi.

0.845***

0.811***

2‐3mi.

0.322***

0.069

3‐4mi.

0.272***

‐0.037

4‐5mi.

‐0.482***

0‐1mi.

‐0.267
0.766***

1‐2mi.

0.268***

0.089

2‐3mi.

‐0.059

‐0.042

3‐4mi.

‐0.114

‐0.086

4‐5mi.

‐0.126*

‐0.124*

0‐1mi.

‐0.615***

‐0.878***

1‐2mi.

‐0.221***

‐0.139**

2‐3mi.

‐0.084

0.053

3‐4mi.

‐0.021

0.098

4‐5mi.

‐0.055

0.068

0.623***

‐6.603***

‐7.283***

0.788***

0.681***

(Notes ‐ *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01; All significant estimates in bold)
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Table 5(a): Store formats with controlling for zoning restrictions26

Variable
Constant

Commercialization
Popula‐
tion

Per
Capita
Income

Compe‐
tition
Effect

0‐1mi. coefficient
1‐2mi. multiplier/coeff.
2‐3mi. multiplier/coeff.
3‐4mi. multiplier/ coeff.
4‐5mi. multiplier/ coeff.
0‐1mi. coefficient
1‐2mi. multiplier
2‐3mi. multiplier
3‐4mi. multiplier
4‐5mi. multiplier
SM; 0‐1mi. coeff.
SS; 0‐1mi. coeff.
LA; 0‐1mi. coeff.
NF; 0‐1mi. coeff.
FD; 0‐1mi. coeff.
SC; 0‐1mi. coeff.

Supermarket
(SM)
na
0.078***
1.757***

Superstore
(SS)
‐2. 013***
0.095***
1.628***

0.368**

1.191***

‐1.842**
0.444**
0.353*
0.025
‐1.405
‐2.188***

‐2.300**
‐2.481**
‐2.403
‐0.170
0.810

Ltd. Assort.
Natural
(LA)
Food (NF)
‐1.937**
‐3.193***
0.106***
0.162***
1.308***
2.028***
0.704***
0.270***
0.258***
‐0.087
0.928***
0.838**
0.327**
‐0.079
‐0.201
‐0.212

‐2.727***
‐0.791
0.790**
1.644**

‐4.417
‐2.257
2.088

Food & Drug
(FD)
‐0.939***
0.124***
1.914***

0.940***

‐2.141**
‐1.128

0.486***
0.278***
0.172***
0.238

1‐2mi. multiplier
2‐3mi. multiplier
3‐4mi. multiplier
4‐5mi. multiplier

  
  

‐7.297***
0.998***

(Notes ‐ *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01; All significant estimates in bold)
26

For Supercenter format, estimates corresponding to population at different distance bands are coefficients rather than distance multipliers.
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Supercenter
(SC)
‐0.339
0.106***
‐0.245
0.872***
1.051***
0.586***
‐0.049
0.718***

‐4.572***

Table 5(b): Store formats without controlling for zoning restrictions

Variable
Constant

Commercialization
Popula‐
tion

Per
Capita
Income

Compe‐
tition
Effect

0‐1mi. coefficient
1‐2mi. multiplier/coeff.
2‐3mi. multiplier/coeff.
3‐4mi. multiplier/ coeff.
4‐5mi. multiplier/ coeff.
0‐1mi. coefficient
1‐2mi. multiplier
2‐3mi. multiplier
3‐4mi. multiplier
4‐5mi. multiplier
SM; 0‐1mi. coeff.
SS; 0‐1mi. coeff.
LA; 0‐1mi. coeff.
NF; 0‐1mi. coeff.
FD; 0‐1mi. coeff.
SC; 0‐1mi. coeff.

Supermarket
(SM)
na
0.171***
2.048***

Superstore
(SS)
‐1. 311***
0.195***
2.193***

0.277***

0.907***

‐1.753***
‐0.872*
‐0.422*
‐0.138
‐0.567
‐2.549***

‐0.506***
‐1.504*
‐2.186
‐1.769*
‐0.225

Ltd. Assort.
Natural
(LA)
Food (NF)
‐1.272***
‐2.583***
0.205***
0.248***
2.020***
2.525***
0.555***
0.084
0.066
‐0.174
0.812***
0.688***
0.144**
‐0.067
‐0.201
‐0.241

‐1.389***
‐1.930
‐1.358*
0.952**

‐1.938
‐3.047
1.488

0.292***
0.075
‐0.051
0.077

1‐2mi. multiplier
2‐3mi. multiplier
3‐4mi. multiplier
4‐5mi. multiplier

  

‐8.311***

  

0.875***

(Notes ‐ *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01; All significant estimates in bold)
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Food + Drug
(FD)
‐0.812***
0.221***
2.359***

0.814***

‐2.131***
0.512

Supercenter
(SC)
‐0.341
0.200***
0.138
0.596**
0.814***
0.301*
‐0.185
0.525***

‐4.788***

Appendix A
Step 0: Initial Population ‐ Generate a set of T vectors of starting values for retailers’ beliefs
about rivals’ CCPs for location choices,  P01 ; P02 ;...; P0T 

Step 1: Locally Contractive, q‐NPL Iteration ‐ Maximize the pseudo likelihood (Equation 11) to

 

obtain a set of T vectors of parameter estimates: tn  arg max L Pnt1 , 




 ,

and a new



population of CCPs using the q‐NPL operator: Pˆnt   q Pnt1 , tn .
Within each market, normalize the CCPs for each store format so that the CCPs of all formats
add up to one. Essentially, for each format f, and market location l, we have:

Pˆflnt   q  Pflnt 1 ,  tn 

lm

   P
F

q

t
fln 1

f 1 l 1

,  tn 

Step 2: Selection of Parents ‐ Based on their fitness, draw, with replacement, T ‘mother’ CCP
vectors and T ‘father’ CCP vectors from the set,  Pˆn1 ; Pˆn2 ;...; PˆnT  and form couples or Parents.









CCPs with high likelihood values, L Pˆnt , tn , and those closer to convergence (Absolute value



of Pˆnt  Pnt1

 closer to zero) are considered more fit to continue. In our problem, we use the

following fitness criterion:

 





h Pˆnt  1 ln  L Pˆnt , tn   2 Pˆnt  Pnt1


where, 1 and 2 are small positive constants. The tth CCP vector gets selected with the
probability:

  

S t  exp h Pˆnt

 exp  h  Pˆ
T

j 1
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n

j



 







Now, we have the set of couples:  Pˆn1' , Pˆn1'' ; Pˆn2' , Pˆn2'' ;...; PˆnT ' , PˆnT '' 



Step 3: Crossover and Mutation – Obtain an offspring from each couple as follows:







Pnt  D  Pˆnt '  Z n   n  Pˆnt '  1  D   Pˆnt ''  Z n   n  Pˆnt ''



where, D is a vector of indicators for the identity of the parent who provides each element of the





CCPs. Its elements are i.i.d. with Pr D j  1  0.5 for the jth element. Zn is another vector of
indicators for the identity of the elements of the CCPs which undergo mutation. Its elements are





also i.i.d. with Pr Z jn  1  0.5

n . Hence, with multiple iterations, as we get closer to the

global optimum, we allow the amount of mutations to reduce to zero. Finally,  n is a vector
whose elements represent the magnitude of a mutation. It is also defined such that its elements



go to zero with multiple iterations. Specifically, we use:  jn  U 0.5

n , 0.5

n



As with Step 1, within each market, again normalize the CCPs so that the CCPs of all
formats add up to one. Now, we have the new set of CCPs,  Pn1 ; Pn2 ;...; PnT  .
Iterate Steps 1‐3 until the set of CCPs converges.

Appendix B
In their classification of land types, NLCD 2001 combines high density residential land
and commercial land but NLCD 1992 separates them. Hence, we match the two data sets using
ArcGIS software to separate the pixel data for all residential land areas from land areas with
commercial activity in 2001. We are able to do this separation because land areas which were
high density residential in 1992 are unlikely to convert to commercial land areas by 2001, and
vice versa. If there is a situation where an area that was low‐density residential in 1992 has been
classified as commercial land in the 2001 data then we do a quick visual inspection of the
geographical area using Google Earth to confirm whether that area is truly commercial land or if
it has converted into a high density residential land.
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